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Dasinger: State ex rel. Perry v. District Court

RECENT DECISIONS
STATUTE PROVIDING FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF A JUDGE BY AFFIDAVIT WITHOUT PROOF OF BIAS OR PREJUDICE Is NOT A LEGISLATIVE INFRINGEMENT

Montana, who was disqualified from hearing an action to quiet title, refused to remove himself
from the case, contending that the Fair Trial Law' is unconstitutional.
Held: The statute is constitutional. The procedure outlined by the statute
does not infringe upon the judicial power. State ex rel. Perry v. District
Court, 22 St. Rptr. 406, 400 P.2d 648 (Mont. 1965).2
Montana's original Fair Trial Law was passed in 19033 as an amendment to the existing disqualification statute.4 The Fair Trial Law
provided that in civil matters, any district judge could be disqualified
upon timely filing of an affidavit alleging bias and prejudice. No
proof was necessary to substantiate the allegations. Upon the filing
of the affidavit, the judge would be immediately disqualified, and
would be without further authority to act in the case. However, he
could still perform administrative functions.5 Any party could disqualify up to five judges by means of affidavit. 6 The Fair Trial Law
was amended by the 1909 legislature. This amendment reduced from
five to two the number of judges who could be disqualified by each
party. It also provided that if there were more than one judge in a
district, another judge from the same district must be called in to
preside; and upon disqualification of all the judges in a district, either
ON JUDICIAL POWER.-A district court judge in

a judge from another district must be called, or the proceeding transferred to another judicial district.7 Additional amendments to the
Fair Trial Law have related to the timeliness of the affidavit 8 and
'REvISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 93-901(4). (REvISED CODES OF MONTANA are
hereinafter referred to as R.C.M.)
'Although the basic question considered by the instant case was the constitutionality of
the Fair Trial Law, there are certain procedural problems apparently inherent to a
statute of this type. The problems are discussed in the latter portion of this article.
'Laws of Montana 1903, 2d Extra Session, ch. 3, § 1 at 10; the history behind this
enactment is traced in HOWARD, MONTANA, HIGH, WIDE AND HANDSOME 50 (1943).
'Montana Code of Civil Procedure 1895, § 180.
'R.C.M. 1947, § 93-901(4) The judge may arrange the calendar, regulate the order of
business, transfer the proceeding to some other court, or call in some other district
judge to act in such action or proceeding.
'Supra note 4.
'Laws of Montana 1909, ch. 114, § 1 at 161, R.C.M. 1907, § 6315(4).
'a. Laws of Montana 1927, ch. 93, §1 at 327, R.C.M. 1921, § 8868(4). The legislature
changed the earlier requirement that the filing be made at any time before the day
fixed for the trial or hearing, to require filing of the affidavit at least 5 days prior
to such trial or hearing (providing that the party filing had notice 5 days prior
to the hearing; if he did not have notice, he was required to file his affidavit of
disqualification immediately upon receipt of notice). The amendment also required
a second disqualification to be made within 3 days after notice of the identity of the
judge assuming jurisdiction over the action.
b. Laws of Montana, 1961, ch. 218, § 1 at 602, R.C.M. 1947, § 93-901(4). The
legislature added the provision that, in single judge districts, the affidavit must be
filed one day prior to the day fixed by the court for the setting of the trial calendar.
The provision was not applicable unless notice of the setting date was given to all
parties by the clerk of the court at least 15 days prior thereto.
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deleted the words "bias and prejudice" from the affidavit.9 Now the
affidavit must state only that the party or his attorney believes he
cannot have a fair trial before the judge against whom the affidavit
is made.
Three general procedures exist for the disqualification of judges on
the basis of bias and prejudice. Most states allow disqualification for
actual bias and prejudice. 10 In these states, the party who seeks disqualification submits affidavits stating facts to support the allegations
of bias and prejudice. If the facts upon which the alleged prejudice
rests are not admitted by the judge, the affiant must prove them. The
evidence produced need not be limited to the case at hand, but may
show personal bias toward client or counsel, temperamental prejudice
to the class of litigation involved, or other recognized ground for
disqualification." The sufficiency, and the truth or falsity of these
proofs is determined at a hearing before the judge challenged,'12 another judge,'1 3 or some other designated authority.14
The second method of disqualification also requires an affidavit
alleging bias and prejudice, and a statement of facts supporting the allegations. The reasons stated may not be frivolous or fanciful. If they
are substantial and plausible, the truth of the statements may not be
questioned. The only power remaining to the disqualified judge is
to rule upon the legal sufficiency of the affidavit of disqualification.
16
The federal courts and the courts of several states use this procedure.
The third method of disqualification-the one under discussion here
-is the so-called "peremptory challenge" or affidavit statute. Generally,
this procedure requires an affidavit that the affiant believes he cannot
have a fair trial because of the bias and prejudice of the judge. The
judge is automatically disqualified upon the filing of the affidavit.
Neither reasons, facts, nor proof are required because the affidavit is
sufficient on its face to disqualify the judge. The courts of most western
c. Laws of Montana 1963, ch. 82, § I at 173, R.C.M. 1947, § 93-901(4). The
legislature changed the time for filing to at least 15 days before the trial or hearing,
and if notice of the trial or hearing was not received prior to this date, then
immediately upon receipt of such notice.
'Laws of Montana 1965, ch. 234, § 1 at 754, R.C.M. 1947, § 93-901(4).
'0 Mose v. Julian, 45 N.H. 52, 84 Am. Dec. 114 (1863); State ex rel. McAllister v.
Slate, 278 Mo. 570, 214 S.W. 85, 8 A.L.R. 1226 (1919); In re Crawford's Estate,
307 Pa. 102, 160 Atl. 585 (1931); Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520
(1948); State v. Doucet, 199 La. 276, 5 So.2d 894 (1942); Broad St. Corp. v. Valco
Mortg. Co., 135 N.J. Eq. 581, 39 A.2d 700, aff. 136 N.J. Eq. 513, 42 A.2d 704, 705
(1945); Taylor v. Taylor, 185 Va. 126, 37 S.E.2d 886 (19465; In re Hupp, 178 Kan.
672, 291 P.2d 428 (1955).
nIn re Crawford's Estate, supra note 10, at 587.
12Haslam v. Morrison, supra note 10, at 523.
"State ex reZ. McAllister v. State, supra note 10, at 88.
4
" State v. Doucet, supra note 10, at 898. Louisiana uses a commissioner to rule on the
facts presented.
"lDickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 477, 140 So. 459 (1932).
'5 Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921). The federal statute also requires the
assertion that the alleged bias is personal. In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381,
cert. denied 368 U.S. 927 (1961); Dickenson v. Parks, supra note 15, at 461.
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and several midwestern states have upheld statutes similar to that
operative in Montana. 1'7 These courts have generally held that there
is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a statute; and that
there must be a plain and palpable abridgement of the judicial function
before such a statute will be held unconstitutional.' 8 Some of these
courts have drawn an analogy between judicial disqualification and a
change of venue.' 9 Similarly, a court has said that the jurisdiction of
the court is not removed, only that of the judge. 20 Other courts have
stated that since actual bias and prejudice need not be shown, proof
of the allegations in the affidavit is justifiably not required. 2' A further
reason given for upholding such statutes is the need to maintain the
22
confidence of the public in the absolute integrity of the courts.
The constitutionality of Montana's original Fair Trial Law was upheld in State ex rel. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Clancy.23 The court
held that removal of the judge had no effect on the jurisdiction of the
court. It analogized the proceeding to disqualify a judge to a proceeding for a change of venue, saying it laid down a rule of procedure
for the observance of the courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction.
The law was held to be of the same character as the laws regulating
continuances, appeals, and the entire subjects of remedies and of practice.
The court noted that:
The mere fact that a law requires the performance by a court of a
particular act upon a given state of fact is not a sufficient test by
which to determine its invalidity, and in many instances the legislature may deprive the court of discretion in the exercise of its
jurisdiction .... It is true that the court, having a discretion as to
a particular matter, cannot, so long as it retains that discretion,
be controlled in the exercise of it. But the whole error is in forgetting

that the court has the discretion only by virtue of the law giving
"State ex rel. Nissen v. Superior Court, 122 Wash. 407, 210 Pac. 674 (1922). Indiana
requires disqualification by affidavit very similar to Montana's, but calls it an
affidavit for a change of venue; Barber v. State, 197 Ind. 88, 149 N.E. 896 (1925) ;
Oregon uses language almost identical to Montana 's and adds a requirement that
the affidavit be made in good faith and not for the purpose of delay, U'Ren v.
Bagely, 118 Or. 77, 245 Pac. 1074, 46 A.L.R. 1173 (1926); the Nevada courts hold
that the affidavit must be filed before a hearing in any contested matter has commenced, State ex rel. Kline v. District Court, 70 Nev. 172, 264 P.2d 396 (1953);
California allows only one disqualification for each side, Johnson v. Superior Court,
50 Cal. 2d 693, 329 P.2d 5 (1958); Arizona requires an affidavit by the party plus
affidavits of three resident electors of the county to disqualify, Speakman v. Sullivan,
32 Ariz. 307, 257 Pac. 986, 56 A.L.R. 169 (1927); Minnesota requires filing within
one day after it is ascertained which judge is to preside at the trial or hearing,
Jones v. Jones, 242 Minn. 251, 64 N.W.2d 508 (1954). See also Price v. Featherstone, 64 Idaho 312, 130 P.2d 853, 143 A.L.R. 40 (1942).
'9 U'Ren v. Bage'y, supra note 17, at 1075.
'"State v. Barber, supra note 17, at 898.
20Price v. Featherstone, supra note 17, at 855.
'State ex rel. Kline v. District Court, supra note 18, at 398.
'State ex rel. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Clancy, 30 Mont. 529, 77 Pac. 312
(1904).
'Ibid. In this case two large Montana copper mining companies were in court; the
Anaconda Company felt the judge who was to hear the case was prejudiced against
them and filed an affidavit alleging prejudice. The judge announced his intention
of proceeding with the trial, whereupon the Anaconda Company procured an alternative writ of prohibition from the Montana Supreme Court which then ruled on the
constitutionality of the Fair Trial Law.
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The court further stated that the imputation of bias and prejudice required the removal of the judge. Since the question of actual bias and
prejudice was not considered, there were no facts to be judicially determined. Therefore, there was no legislative interference with judicial
25
discretion.
However, in State ex rel. Bennett v. Bonner26 the Montana Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional a governor's actions based on a statute
providing that:
If for any cause a district court is not or cannot be held in
any county by the judge or judges thereof, or by a district judge
requested by such judge to hold court, or if the business of the court
in any county is not or cannot be dispatched with reasonable promptness, the governor may, upon application of any interested person,
in
by an order in writing, require some district judge to hold court
27
said county for such time as may be specified in the order.
The court held that the governor could neither exclude or remove from
office the duly elected, qualified, and acting judge of the district, nor
otherwise suspend the powers conferred on the judge by the constitution. It stated that judicial power could not be taken away by legislative action. It is arguable that the Fair Trial Law grants to a
litigant the same power that the statute above granted to the governor.
Under the Fair Trial Law, the judge is barred from further discretionary action after the filing of the affidavit, and may then act only
ministerially. 28 In effect, this procedure deprives a judge of his powers
and gives them to another.
Another result of the Fair Trial Law is that in civil matters the
litigant has the power to remove the presiding judge after verdict and
before hearing on a motion for a new trial.29 There are at least two
objections to this right. The litigant may remove the judge who presided
at the trial if he or his attorney did not like the rulings made by the
judge. Since the law thus appears to give a party the power to control
judicial discretion, it is arguably unconstitutional. 30 Moreover, when
a judge is disqualified after verdict, and a new judge brought in to hear
the motion for a new trial, the new judge must decide the motion
solely on the record of the trial and its transcript. This seemingly vests
in the substitute judge appellate power over the actions of the disqualified judge. Although in one case concern was expressed concerning
the wisdom of allowing disqualification after verdict and before ruling
"Id. at 316.

Ibid., and instant case at 653.
'State ex rel. Bennett v. Bonner, 123 Mont. 414, 214 P.2d 747 (1950).
VR.C.M. 1947, § 93-312.
Supra note 1.
"State ex rel. Carleton v. District Court, 33 Mont. 138, 82 Pac. 789

(1905).

The

criminal disqualification statute does not allow disqualification after verdict and
before hearing on a motion for a new trial. See 26 MONT. L. Rsv. 128 (1964).
O'Bennett v. Bonner, supra note 26, at 757.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol27/iss1/6
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on a motion for a new trial, the Montana Court has ruled that such
disqualification is constitutional. 81
The main objection to peremptory challenge statutes is abuse by
attorneys. The courts sustaining these statutes have generally held
that they are necessary, that abuse is not sufficient reason for abrogation,
82
and that the need for such a statute must be weighed against the abuse.
The employment of the power to disqualify as a delaying tactic is the
most prevalent abuse of the Fair Trial Law.33 For example, an attorney
who may not want to try a case on the date set and who cannot obtain
a continuance, may wait until the last day allowed by the statute and
then disqualify the scheduled judge. His maneuver generally results
in delay of the trial, which may be held over until the next jury term.
The disqualified judge must rule on the affidavit, then call in a new
judge. The new judge must arrange his own calendar to accommodate
the case and the case will probably be set at the end of that calendar.
34
Since our statute allows two judges to be disqualified by each party,
with judicious timing it is a virtual certainty that the desired delay
can be accomplished by two disqualifications. This is especially true
in a one or two judge district.
Another undesirable practice in connection with the use of the
Fair Trial Law is the disqualification of judges during the discovery
and pre-trial procedures.35 Often an attorney summarily disqualifies
a judge after an adverse ruling at the pre-trial conference, or after
an adverse ruling regarding depositions or interrogatories.3 6 In the
process of discovering, defining, and narrowing the issues, there are
bound to be holdings adverse to one party. Because proper regulation
of the discovery and pre-trial procedures may lead to disqualification,
some judges may become hesitant about enforcing the rules.3 7 Perhaps
the powers given a district judge to control discovery procedures under
the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure would be implemented more fully
if disqualification were made more difficult.
It is submitted that statutory corrections should be made to prevent the principal abuses of the Fair Trial Law. One possible method
of foreclosing the delay tactics would be torequire that the disqualifying affidavit be filed within five days after the parties receive notice
which judge is to preside.38 Some minor delay may still occur, due
simply to the mechanics involved in changing judges. The new judge,
however, would have more time to rearrange his own calendar, and
"State ex rel. Carleton v. District Court, supra note 29.
8
2ohn8on v. Superior Court, supra note 17, at 8.
ffWhen asked for their comments on abuses of the Fair Trial Law, seven Montana
attorneys stated delay tactics were the most common method of abuse.
sSupra note 1.
8The same attorneys questiosed in note 32, aupra, stated that this type of abuse was
used quite frequently, although not to the extent of the delay tactic.
"I.e., refusal to issue a protective order requested, denial of a motion to produce, etc.
wIn discussions with three attorneys, this has been advanced as a possible theory for
the failure of some judges to properly enforce the new Rules provisions.
wSupra note 8, comment c.
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the action could be set at an earlier date. Such a rule would automatically cut off the practice of disqualification because of adverse rulings
during discovery or pre-trial procedures. If the right to disqualify a
judge by affidavit were limited to the recommended period, the objections based on alleged control of discretion and possible vesting of
appellate powers in a district judge would no longer have any validity.
Montana's disqualification statute is, on balance, preferable to the
more restricted methods of recusation. Statutes requiring proof of
actual bias and prejudice are undesirable for several reasons: a litigant
may be put to a great deal of expense gathering evidence to prove bias
and prejudice; the hearing on the question of actual bias and prejudice
is time consuming; and, if the question of prejudice is decided adversely to the litigant, he is required to have his cause heard by a
judge whom he believes to be prejudiced against him. Even in those
states following the federal rule, which allows the judge to consider
only the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, a litigant is put to additional
expense and effort. Temperamental prejudice to the class of litigation
involved may not, by itself, sustain a charge of actual bias and prejudice
against a judge; nor would a personality conflict, or animosity on the
part of the judge toward the attorney or client. 39 Yet, a judge may
be unconsciously influenced by any or all of these factors. Proof of
actual bias and prejudice of a judge is extremely difficult. 40 Our advocacy system of practice demands that an attorney be allowed to
disqualify a judge if he feels that his client will not have a fair trial.
Therefore, any of the above reasons should be sufficient. Abuse of
the disqualification statute exists in Montana, and presumably in other
states with similar statutes. In view of the difficulty of proving actual
bias and prejudice, it is submitted that Montana's statute, with provisions to restrict the present abuses, both provides the necessary protection to the litigant, and keeps the courts free from even the appearance of bias and prejudice.
DOUGLAS D. DASINGER

RIGHT TO COUNSEL DURING POLICE INTERROGATION:

AN INTRINSIC RIGHT?-

Dennis White, 16 years of age, was taken to the county attorney's office
for questioning in connection with a murder. A confession was elicited
after a three hour interrogation. White alleged that he was not given
the benefit of his constitutional right to counsel. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Montana, held, since defendant was advised of
his right to counsel and his right to remain silent shortly after interrogation began, and since he did not request such assistance, the failure
4

OClyma v. Kennedy, 64 Conn. 310, 29 AtI. 539 (1894).
People 'v. Emmett, 123 Cal. App. 678, 12 P.2d 92 (1932).
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